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Parents do not generally decide to send their children to work when a child reaches a critical
age: this decision is largely made as part of a dynamic process, which starts at the time of
household formation, and is shaped by expectations of the role of children as future assets.
However, children's mortality is likely to influence the behaviour of households with respect
to childbirth, not only through the average expected number of surviving children, but also
through the uncertainty (or risk) about the realization of such expectations.  Changes in the
mean and variance of the survival rate can therefore affect parental choices.  The majority of
the current empirical analyses at the micro level have been based only on one dimension of
mortality (its mean) and suggests a positive relationship between mortality and fertility. The
use of only this dimension might not be sufficient to describe the relationship between
fertility and mortality and subsequently, child labor. This paper by Atella and Rosati gives
attention to these interlinkages and fills in a gap in the existing literature.  With the use of
individual microdata for India, which include effects of the so-called "community" variables,
Atella and Rosati present some interesting policy implications.  For example, an
improvement in general sanitary conditions can lead to a reduction of the fertility rate via an
increase in the mean survival rate.  But, if an increase in the expected probability of survival
is also associated with a reduction of its variance, there are two contrasting effects.  On the
one hand, the reduction of mortality will lead to a reduction of fertility.  On the other hand,
the reduction in the risk associated with each child will generate incentives to higher fertility.
This is an important paper for broadening the analysis of decisions leading to child labor,
which is the task of future research of the World Bank's Global Child Labor Program.Abstract
In this paper we present a non altruistic model of demand for children in the
presence of uncertainty about children's survival. Children are seen as assets, as
they  provide  help  during  old  age. If  certain  conditions are  met,  both  the
fimancial  market and the family network are used to transfer resources to old
age. Theoretical predictions relative to the change in the mean and variance of
the survival rate are derived. The empirical analysis is based on data from the
Human Development of India (HDI) survey. Different models for count data
variables, such as Poisson, Hurdle and ZI models have been employed in the
empirical  analysis. The  results highlight  the  importance of  the  uncertainty
about children's  survival in determining parental choices, thus showing that
realized or  expected children's  death  is not  the  only  dimension that  links
fertility  decision  to  children's  mortality.  The  policy  implications  of  such
findings are briefly discussed.1.  Introduction
Children's mortality is likely to influence the behaviour of households with respect to
childbirth not  only  through the  average expected number of  surviving children,  but  also
through  the  uncertainty  (or  riskiness  if  we  assume  households  know  the  probability
distribution) about the realization of such expectations.
Such  an  issue  has  seldom  received attention  in  the  fertility  literature  and,  to  our
knowledge, its  empirical implications has  never been tested.  In a recent  paper  - Rosati
(1996)  - the  implications  for  saving  and  fertility of  a  social  security  system has  been
analyzed  within  the  framework  of  a  non  altruistic  intergenerational  model  of  family
relationship characterized by the presence of uncertainty about the children's  survival. Here
we retain the same approach and extend the theoretical model to derive the effects on fertility
of a change of the expected average survival rate and of its variance. This set-up allows us to
derive some testable implications of the theory that will be used for the empirical analysis.
Our main objective, is to assess the importance of the expected survival rate and of the
uncertainty about children's survival in fertility decisions.
The available empirical evidence, at both micro and macro level, seems to indicate the
existence of a positive relationship between mortality and fertility. The direction of causality
is,  however,  open  to  discussion  (see  Chowdhury  (1988)),  and  it  appears  that  joint
determination is  likely. Also, the  size of the "replacement"  effect is  open  to  discussion.
According to  Olsen (1980), the dimension of such an effect  obtained by  dealing with the
endogeneity of infant mortality appears to be smaller than previously thought.
The majority of the empirical analyses, also those at a micro level, have been based only
on one dimension of mortality (mainly its average value or its realization). However, the use
of only one dimension might not be sufficient to describe the relationship between fertility
and mortality.  The existence of more complex  links  between the two  variables has  also
interesting policy implications that will be discussed in the paper.
Finally, in recent empirical studies on fertility (as well as on schooling, mortality, etc.)
based on microdata, great attention has  been paid to  the so-called "community"  variable.
While their empirical relevance appears confirmed in many studies, the theoretical reasons for
their introduction in  the analysis have seldom been discussed. The present paper offers a
1theoretical foundation for the use of such variables.
The  estimates  have  been  carried  out  using  techniques  for  count  data  models.  In
particular, Poisson,  Negative Binomials, Hurdle and Zero Inflated (ZI) models have been
employed and the selection among them has been based on a testing procedure. As we will
see, the Hurdle-Poisson and the ZI Poisson models turn out to be the most appropriate for the
data considered. Moreover, interesting differences emerge among the coefficients estimated in
the two stages, indicating how relevant information on fertility behaviour can be obtained by
the appropriate use of such models.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the non altruistic model and
derive some comparative static results. Section 4 reviews briefly the data-set employed for our
empirical analysis and presents the econometric strategy used to derive the empirical results.
Section 5 is devoted to present the empirical analysis. Finally, in section 6 we discuss the
policy implications of these findings and draw some conclusions.
2.  Uncertainty and Reproductive Decision
We consider a three period overlapping generation model. Individuals earn their income
during the second period of life when they also take and realize their reproductive decisions.
In the first and in the last period of life, consumption is financed, not necessarily fully, by
inter-generational transfers. In particular we show that, under certain conditions, the middle-
aged make transfers to both the young (children) and the old (parents). The former can be seen
as a way of transferring resources to the future in order to secure consumption when old,
while the latter can be seen as repayment to the parents of the "loan" received when young.
We also assume that a self-enforcing family constitution is in place (Cigno 1993), so
that  children  will  not  voluntarily  default  on  their  repayments.  Enforceability  can  be
guaranteed, for example, if  any member of any generation adopts a strategy according to
which he/she will comply with the family "rules", i.e., repay his debt at the family interest rate
when middle-aged, if and only if his parents repaid their own debt. Default from the children
is, then, the threat that the parents have to face if they disobey the family rules. Note that such
a threat is credible as  it is  in the threatener's interest to carry it out.  The set of all such
2strategies is a Nash-equilibrium, because anybody's best response to the threat of punishment
is to comply with the rules and, at the same time, to threaten to punish anyone who does not
comply. This  equilibrium is  perfect  in  the sub-games'  because it is  clearly in  a person's
interest not to pay back a loan where that can be done without fear of punishment.
As children are seen by parents as an asset, reproductive decisions are determined as the
result  of  the joint  decision  of  the  middle-aged concerning  the  number of  assets  to  buy
(children to raise) and the amount to invest in (lend to) each one. It is important to distinguish
between the cost of having a child and the transfer made  to him. The latter represents the
amount of resources that the parent makes available for the consumption of the young and that
the young pays back to the old when middle-aged, the former is an unrecoverable cost made
up  of parental time,  health  hazards and  the  like. Here  we  assume  that  there  is  a  fixed,
unrecoverable cost, c, that the parents will bear for each child they have.
If there were no uncertainty, given the non altruistic setting, in our model parents would
have just one child and lend to him the whole amount of resources they are willing to transfer
to the future. Nevertheless, even if the risk of a voluntary default is absent because of the self-
enforcing family constitution, in order to be able to repay their "debt" to the parents, children
have to become middle-aged and be able to work.
3.  Fertility, Intergenerational Transfers and Mortality
In all the situations described above, putting all of one's resources in one child (asset),
who  has positive probability of  not  surviving to  middle-age,  might  not be  optimal. The
optimal  number  of  children  obviously  depends  on  the  specific  characteristics  of  the
"uncertainty" considered.
Here we assume that each child has a probability of surviving to middle age equal to p,
and of dying when young equal to (l-p).  Such probabilities are considered exogenous.
Let s denote the number of surviving children. This number is unknown at the moment
of the decision on fertility and intergenerational transfers. Then:
Assuming  that each  family  member  can observe  the behavior  of the others.
3E(s)  = np  and  Var(s) = np(l  -p)
We assume that p is unknown to the individual. Let p be a random variable with mean 7r
and variance  v.  Then, it  follows by  the  law  of  iterated expectations  that the  number of
surviving children s has mean. 2
E(s)  = (E(s/p))  = n r
and variance
Var(s)  = Var(E(s/p))  + E(Var(s/p))  = n(n - I)v + n;r(  - )  (1)
Each member of generation t receives income, /,  when middle-aged. .He can then use it
for current consumption, C2, and for transfers to his nt children; bt is the transfer per child.
Part of the income, however, has to be used to repay the transfers received from his parents,
bt-p.  Old people do not  get any income, but finance their old-age consumption,  C3 ,out  of
transfers from their children and from savings invested in the financial market. For each child
the parents have to  face an unrecoverable  cost of c.  In the financial market  middle-aged
individuals can buy a risk-free asset that earns a return given by an interest factor i. Children
and bonds are, therefore, competing assets in the family portfolio: an individual chooses the
portfolio composition and size that maximize his lifetime utility.
An individual maximizes the following expected utility function, with respect to n, x,
and A:
V = U2 (c2)  + U3(E(C 3), Var(C 3 ))  (2)
subject to
C2  = Y' - A' - b-lp  - cn,
C3 = xA'p  + (1- x)A'i
and x>  0,
where A indicates the total amount of resources transferred from middle to old age and x is the
share of the risky asset, i.e. of total transfers to children, in the portfolio. Notice that once n,
A, and x are determined, transfers per child are implicitly defined by xA = bn.
2 We thank the editor for suggesting us how to treat the uncertainty about the probability of survival.
4The expectation of C 3 is given therefore by:
E(C3) = E(bps)+ (1- x)Ai = bpnz  + (I - x)Ai,
as the market offers a risk free asset.
The variance of C 3, making use of (1), is given by:
Var(C3) = b'p 2Var(s) = b2p2co
where  a  = n(n-1)1v+n.(1  -r).
Ax  2X220
As b=-,  we have Var(C3 )=A2x  p  2-.
n  n
Substituting back into eq. (2) for the first two moments and maximizing with respect to
n, x, and A, we get the following first order conditions:
n  anr(  3 )U3a  -CU2  =C  (3)
aVar(C)  4
aVr  U3 + A(i - r)U3= O
aVA(C 3) U_  3 (xr+(-xi  =  (5)
where U3 2 indicates the derivative of the utility function with respect to the variance of future
consumption.  U 3 L  is  assumed  to  be  negative.  r  indicates  the  expected  returns  from
intergenerational transfers, r =p;r.
Eq.  (3) has  an interior  solution only  if  an(C3)  is negative. If an  increase in the
an
number of children increases the variance of future consumption, individuals would not have
any interest in diversifying their "portfolio", i.e. in having a number of children higher than
one (if they decide to use the family network at all).
aVar( 3 is negative if  v - ,r(1 - r) <  0. In words, the model has an interior solution if
an
the uncertainty of the individual about value of the probability of survival, p,  is smaller than
the expected variation in the survival rate. In what follows we assume that the above condition
is met.
5Eq.  (3)  gives  the  optimal  number  of  children  as  a  decreasing  function  of  the
unrecoverable  cost of having a  child, and as a  positive function of the variance of future
consumption, for a given level of A and x (i.e. for a given level of transfers to old age through
intergenerational  transfers).  These  are  trade-off  obtained  holding  the  other  endogenous
variables  constant. The results of the comparative statics will be discussed below. Observe
that in order  to have an interior  solution, c, the unrecoverable cost of each child, must be
positive.  In fact as children are demanded as "insurance" against the uncertainty of future
income,  if  there were  no  unrecoverable cost  individuals  would  have the  largest possible
number of children (provided  n(C 3) < 0).
an
The first order conditions for x (eq. 4) can be rewritten as:
uri  aVar(C 3)
r;--i = - 'i(6)
U3A
As  U 3  <  0, the right-hand side of (6) is positive. An interior solution for x requires,
therefore, the expected returns to intergenerational transfers to exceed the  market interest rate
in order to compensate for the risk associated with making transfers to children. 3
Finally eq. (5) is the intertemporal arbitrage condition defined over the average returns
from the portfolio  selected. Such an arbitrage condition  takes also in  to consideration the
increase in the variance of old age consumption due to an increase in total transfers to old age.
On the basis of eq. (3)-(5) the comparative statics effects were computed for changes in
income, returns to  intergenerational transfers and in the variance of the children's  survival
probability. A change in  the returns to  intergenerational transfers has  obviously the same
effects as a change in the expected survival probability.
In general the results from the comparative statics exercise are ambiguous. However,
one of the crucial variables in determining the sign of the comparative statics is the degree of
relative risk aversion. As the algebra is very cumbersome it is omitted from the paper and
only the main results  are discussed. In particular, if  the degree of relative risk aversion is
'Note that (6) is a necessary  but not sufficient  condition  for the existence  of a family  transfer  system.  Even  if (6)
holds, middle aged individuals  could still consider  leaving  the family system, as the credit market offers an
alternative  way to finance  old age consumption.  Refer  to Rosati  (1996)  for a discussion  of this point.
6relatively "low", then the effects of a change in the exogenous variables are likely to have the
sign presented in Table 1.
An increase in income when middle-aged will tend to shift the portfolio of the family
towards the risky asset, i.e. the inter-generational transfers. This implies an increase in the
amount of transfers per child and/or an increase in the number of children. If individuals have
a relative "low" degree of risk aversion, they will reduce the number of children and increase
total transfers, A. When income in the second period of life increases, the individual is willing
to transfer part of it to old age. If the relative degree of risk aversion is low, people will prefer
to  increase both  the variance and  the expected value of old  age consumption. In fact, by
reducing the number of children further, resources are freed for consumption, both present and
future, and part of these resources is added to intertemporal transfers. Then the amount of
transfers per child will unambiguously increase. If, on the contrary, individuals are "very"
averse to risk, they will use the extra resource available, both to increase the mean of future
consumption and to reduce its variance. In this case n will increase, while total transfer to old
age A will decrease: consumption when old will increase, but less that in the previous case.
The effect on the amount of transfers per child is ambiguous as both n and x increase.
An individual can react to a change in the variance of future consumption through two
channels. On the one hand he can increase the demand for children (eq. 3), on the other he can
reduce the share of the risky asset (i.e., of the intergenerational transfers) in its portfolio (eq.
4). If the degree of risk aversion is not "too" high, the individual will reduce the number of
children and the share of the risky assets in the portfolio. The effect on total transfers to old
age is ambiguous, but is likely to be positive. The reduction in n will leave more resources
Table 1
Comparative Static Results
When  the degree of  risk aversion  is low (sufficient  condition)
n  X  A
y  - +  +
v  - +
r  ?  +
7available for old-age consumption. On the other hand, the larger amount of resources invested
in  the  market  will reduce the  expected return  from postponed  consumption,  but  also  its
variance.
If there are no financial markets or other instruments for transferring resources to  old
age, an increase of the variance of old age consumption will increase n. In the model utilized
here, an increase of the variance of the survival rate will make intergenerational transfers less
attractive as a way of transferring resources to old age relative to the other instruments. Hence
the individual will react  by having less children and  moving towards the "market". If no
"market" is available, then in order to reduce the riskiness of its old age consumption, the
individual has no other choice but to devote part of his middle-age resources to buy more
insurance, i.e., to increase the number of children.
An increase in the expected returns  from intergenerational transfers will most  likely
decrease the amount transferred to old age (A). This does not imply, however, a reduction of
old age consumption, as the return to intertemporal transfers are now higher. The share of the
risky assets in the portfolio (intra-family transfers) will also rise, if risk aversion is "high".
The individual will hence compensate the increase in the overall riskiness of his portfolio by
increasing the number of children. If, on the other hand, the degree of risk aversion is "low",
we might observe a reduction in the number of desired children. In this case, some of the
increase in old  age resources generated by the increase in x and p,  will be transferred to
middle age by means of the reduction in the fixed expenditure for children due to the smaller
number of children desired.
4. Estimates of the Fertility Equations
The model  presented  in  Section  3 could  be  easily extended  to  accommodate more
explicitly for the role of other variables known both theoretically and empirically to influence
the desired number of children. Male and female wage rates, sex preferences and the like.
However, no new  insights will be gained by explicitly introducing such variables into the
theoretical model. Hence we will take such variables into account in the empirical analysis,
without extending our theoretical model to include them.
We will therefore use in the estimates a reduced form fertility equation derived from eq.
(3)-(5) that includes also a set of other explanatory variables like male and female wage rate,
8age, and other relevant variables.
4.1 The data set
All data are from the Human Development of India Survey carried out by the NCAER
of New  Delhi. This  is a  multi-model  nationally representative  sample  survey conducted
during 1994 in the rural areas of India. A two stage stratified and partially self weighting
design was used to sample a total of 34,398 households spread over 1,765 villages and 195
districts  in  16  states.  Two  separate  survey instruments  were  devised,  one  to  elicit  the
economic and income parameters from an adult male member and the other to collect data on
outcomes  such  as  literacy,  education,  health,  morbidity,  nutrition,  and  demographic
parameters from the adult female members of the household. The data are representative at the
level  of  all  India,  according to  States and  population  groups and  according  to  selected
population groups for the selected States.
Information on reproductive behavior are contained in a special part of the survey and
constitutes the basis of the data set utilized for the estimates. Information about the husband
and household level variables were added by merging the "reproductive information" file with
the individual and household files.
4.2 Definition of the variables
The dependent variable is defined as the total number of live-births had by a woman of
age 13 to 49.4 The explanatory variables include the age of the wife, the age of the husband,
various measures of income and wealth, dummies for the level of education of both wife and
husband, dummies for the religion of the head of the household, the number of children dead
up to the age of 5, male and female wage rates and the mean and variance of the children's
survival rate. All  these variables, with the exclusion of the  last four are measured at the
individual or, where relevant, at the household level and their definition does not pose any
special problem (see Table 2 for summary statistics).
Rather than fitting a wage equation, we have decided to employ the average male and
female wage  rates observed at village level. Most of the people in the survey are farmers.
'  In the fertility  literature  and in the official  statistics  the "period  at risk" is considered  from 15  to 44 years.  The
distribution  of age in this sample  of women is such that we have only 2.08% of women below 18 years and
9Only a small fraction of them spend some time in market activities. The number of women
involved in activities external to the household is even smaller. The relative wage at village
level appears, in such a situation, to offer a better measure of the relative value of the time of
man and women in the market.
To measure the mean and the variance of the survival rate expected by the household is
rather demanding. Ideally we would like to have the information on the expectation held by
the  couples at the  beginning of  their  reproductive activity  and  on the  revision of  such
expectation during the fertile period. Obviously, this would require a large panel data set that
is not available. Instead, we decided to exploit the cross-sectional variation in the data at
village level and used it as proxy for the expectation of the variance and of the mean of the
survival rate. In particular, we computed the mean and the variance of the survival rate (up to
the age of 5) at village level from the individual data available for each village. If the cross-
village differences have not changed widely over time, then our proxies should be a relatively
good measure of inter-village differences in (expected) survival rates. As for some villages
there are only few individual observations, we also used the mean and the variance computed
at district level to check the robustness of our results.
4.3 Econometric methodology usedfor the estimation
The empirical literature on count data models is based on Poisson Models. According
to  Poisson models, the number of events  in an interval (O,t) is a  stochastic process with
independent increments in non overlapping time periods. One of the main drawback of the
Poisson model is that it postulate the equality between mean and variance (equidispersion).
From the empirical point of view the equidispersion is rarely observed, thus rendering the
Poisson model frequently unsatisfactory or inappropriate. According to Gurmu and Trivedi
(1996) the "excess of zero" or the "zero inflation" problem from one side and the 'failure  of
conditional  independence  assumption"  from  the  other  side  are  the  main  causes  for
experiencing under and over-dispersion.
It  is  for  this  reason  that  less  restrictive models  have  been  developed in  order  to
overcome the lack of equality between mean and variance. Among them, Negative Binomial
models are the most known and used in the recent empirical literature when overdispersion in
3.29%  above  45 years.  Utilizing  a sample  of women  aged 15-41  does  not affect  the result in any significant  way.
10the data occurs. Hurdle models and "Zero Inflated" or "Zero Altered" models can represent a
valid  alternative  to  Negative  Binomial  models  when  under-dispersion  is  detected
(Winkelmann, 1995).
Hurdle  and  zero  inflated  models  are able  to  handle  zeros  in  a  way  that  allow
decomposing the decision processes underlying (a) the choice to have children at all and (b)
the  choice  about  the  number  of  children,  once  decided  to  have  children.  Having this
distinction in mind, it is extremely useful to follow Shonkwiler and Shaw (1996) in their
derivation of the Single-Hurdle model.
Let us define y 1 as the number of births had by a woman. According to our previous
classification, our population consists of women who had at least one child, and women who
never had children (but we may or may not know if these women will some time in the future
want to have children). Further, let Di represent the latent decision variable to have a child; it
follows that if Di  < 0, then it means that there are some impediments to having a  child.
Specifically, we  adopt the discrete  specification Prob(Di = 0) = exp(-0i) where 0, can be
parametrized as
Oi= exp(zi'y),
and 7 is an unknown vector of parameters.
If the number of children is positive, then,
E(yi) = 2i=  exp(Fjizi),
where z  is  the  vector  of  relevant exogenous  variables, y  is  its  corresponding vector of
parameters.
The  sequential  (single-hurdle)  model  can  be  represented,  following  Winkelmann  and
Zimmermann (1995), as
P(Y=O) = fi(O)
P(Y=y)=f2(y).[1-f1(O)] / [l-f2(O)] = (I)f2(Y),  for y = 1, 2,.
where fi and f2 are any probability distribution functions for nonnegative integers and where fi
governs the hurdle part and f2  the parent process.
It then follows that the likelihood function for the single-hurdle model with Poisson
parent function specification is (Mullahy, 1986):
1111  exp(-  , ) n (1  - exp(- 0,  ))exp(- A,  )s Yj
y=O  y>O
LSH =  [(1  - exp(- 2, ))y,!]
This formulation is attractive because if O0  = Ai, then the Single-Hurdle collapses to a
simple Poisson specification.




Finally, a different approach to modeling differently the two stage processes is the one
proposed by Mullahy (1986) and by Lambert (1992). Zero Inflated count model can usually
be represented in the following way:
{r  + (1-  )r)h(yi,3),  y,  = 0
|(I  -)r)  h(yj,d),  i=y,  =1,2,3,...
Zero Inflated Poisson Models and  Zero Inflated Negative Binomial models can be
obtained by simply replacing the h(yi,  d) with the Poisson and Negative Binomial distribution.
5. Empirical results
5.1  The Econometric Design
Our strategy has been to move from the Poisson regression model to the less restrictive
count data models discussed in the previous section. The Poisson regression model has been
employed in order to have a reference estimate. We have also run the same Poisson models
assuming  the existence of misspecifications. Although  consistency is guaranteed with the
Poisson model, the asymptotic covariance matrix differs and this causes the standard errors to
be  different.  In  Table  3,  for  each  model  we  have  reported  t-stat  values using  Pseudo
Maximum  Likelihood (PMLE), assuming a constant variance-mean ratio. Even if different
from the MLE estimates, PMLE t-stat values do not  change at all the significance of the
12parameters.
We then run three tests on the equality between mean and variance, to see if the Poisson
model could be considered as the true data generating process for our count variable. The first
two tests are from Lee (1986). Both (Lee Testl  and Lee Test2) tests the equality of variance
and mean.  Under Ho (that mean and  variance are equal)  they are distributed  as  N(0,1).
Rejection indicates that the Poisson assumption is invalid.
The third test is from Wooldridge (1996), and is a regression-based test in which the
dependent  variable  (standardized  residuals  -1)  is  regressed  on  the  fitted  values.  The
significance of the t-statistics leads to the rejection of the Poisson restriction, and a positive
(negative) coefficient indicates over-dispersion (under-dispersion). The results of these tests
are reported on the bottom of Table 3. According to our estimates, all tests reject the Poisson
model and the Wooldridge test indicates the existence of under-dispersion.
On the basis of these results, the next step has been to estimate Hurdle and ZI models 5'6
with Poisson specification.
S.2 Results of the estimates
Overall, the results obtained are quite good and in line with the theory exposed in the
previous paragraphs. All the results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
We will limit our discussion to the Hurdle-Poisson models (Table 4) as they have the
best statistical properties. In particular, we first discuss the results of the second stage and,
then, highlight the differences with respect to the first stage.
The second stage of the Hurdle models represents the decision to have a certain number
of children once decided to have children. An important role in this decision process is played
by the age of the woman. As our dependent variable is the number of children ever born to a
woman of age between 13 and 49 years old, the "period at risk" is an important variable to
5For  computational  reasons  we  used a Logit  specification  as first stage  for both  models.
6 Estimation  of these  models  has been  possible  thanks  to the development  of a specific  procedure  for count data
written in TSP ver. 4.5. In fact, even  though count data procedures  are fairly available  in many econometric
packages,  no one has yet a package  that  allows  to estimate  consistently  all these  models.  The " COUNJT"  module
implemented  in TSP has been tested  against available  empirical  results (using data from Gurmu and Trivedi
(1996)  and across  different  packages  (GAUSS,  Stata,  Eviews)).  The COUNT  module  and the relative  data used
in this  paper are available  upon  request  by the authors.
13consider to explain the number of children had by each woman.  In fact, we hardly would
expect that a 18 year old girl can have the same number of children as a 49 year old woman.
We have approached this "period at risk" problem in two ways. The first utilizes both
the linear and the quadratic terms of the age of the parents and the length of marriage duration
as regressors The second approach includes only the logarithm of parent's  age to reflect the
hypothesis of "proportional risk". The results highlight the importance of the variables that
proxies the "period at risk". The results from both specifications are very similar, with the
exception that when we use the logarithm of age the coefficient of marriage duration becomes
not significant. The remaining results are extremely robust to both specifications and they do
not show any significant change 7. Both the linear and the quadratic terms of the age of the
parents are significant with the expected sign. However, the coefficients of woman's age are
both better determined and, on average, ten times larger with respect to those of the age of the
man. Marriage duration has also a significant impact on observed fertility, with a coefficient
similar to that of the age of the man.
The education of the husband does not significantly influence fertility choices, while the
woman's  education has a significantly negative effect. This confirms well-known results. In
our case, because relative wages were not significant (see below), woman's education might
also  capture  the  effects on  fertility  of  the  earning potential  of  the  woman  outside the
household.  The  dummies  for the  religion  of the  household's  head  are  also  significant.
Muslims and  others tend to have a  higher fertility with  respect to  Hindus (the reference
group), while Christians have a smaller amount of offspring.
The  effects  of  income on  fertility have been analyzed using  both  wage  rates and
household income. In both cases we found difficult to identify a clear effect of these variables
on fertility. As discussed above, we computed male and female wage rates as average at
village level. The coefficients of these variables appeared, in the various specifications we
employed,  seldom different  from  zero and  sometime with  the  "wrong"  sign.  We have,
therefore, excluded them from our preferred estimates. Their introduction did not modify in
any relevant way the estimated coefficients for the other variables, with the exception of
female education.  In  fact,  because  of  the  small  number  of  observations  on  man  and,
especially, woman  working in  the market,  wvoman's education might better  approximate
The results with the logarithm of parent age is available upon request by the authors.
14woman's earning potential with respect to actual observed wages.
The effect of the household income on fertility has resulted quite difficult to interpret.
The total household income has a coefficient that is positive, but not significant. The same
result, not shown here, is obtained using per capita or per adult equivalent income. In order to
better  understand the effect  of  income and  wealth on fertility we have  used the  size of
cultivated land and a measure of poverty that classifies households into four groups of relative
poverty to proxy for income effects (and for unreported income). The results obtained with
land size have shown a positive link with the number of births. This might indicate that this
variable is a  better  approximation than reported  income for the earning  potential of the
household. On the other hand, land size and births can be positively correlated because family
members are inputs  in the agricultural production activities of the household. The results
obtained with poverty groups have shown that poorer parents tend to have a smaller amount
of offspring with respect to less poor parents.
These somehow contradictory results about the effects of income on fertility seem to
suggest the possible existence of non linearity. In order to capture these possible non linearity
in a  simple way, we have divided total  household income  into five  groups (according to
criteria provided by the survey) and used five different income variables in the regressions
(Y1-YS). As the results show, within each income group the number of births tends to increase
with income. However as we move to  higher income groups, the elasticity of births with
respect to income becomes smaller.
To measure the effects of the expected survival rate  and of its  variance on fertility
choices, we have introduced in the equations the mean and the variance of the survival rate at
village level. Both variables have negative and significant coefficients. However, as it is well
known that experienced child mortality affects the number of births, the number of children
who died per woman up to the age of five was also introduced only in the estimates of the
second stage. In this way we try to make sure that the effects of expected survival rates are not
significant because of their correlation with child survival experienced by each household.
Controlling for the actual mortality experienced by the household (that turns out to have a
positive and significant coefficient), does not reduce the importance of the expected mean and
variance of the survival rate, whose coefficients remain negative and significant. 8
8  The presence in the  equation  of the  actual infant mortality experienced by the  household might generate
15As mentioned above, in order to further test the soundness of these results we have also
employed in the estimates the mean and variance of the survival rate computed at the district
rather than at the village level. The results (not reported here) show that at district level the
negative effect of both mean and variance are reinforced.
Let us now turn to consider the differences between the first and the second stage of the
Hurdle estimates. The coefficients of the age of the wife and of the husband are larger in the
first stage, indicating that the decision whether to have a child is influenced more strongly by
age than the decision about the number of children. Also, the religion of the household's head
appear to influence differently the two decisions. Christians are more likely to have children,
but also tend to have a small number of children (the dummy for Christians has a positive sign
in the first stage and a negative sign in the second stage). The role of education appears less
well  determined in  the  first  stage.  The  education of  the  husband  appears to  influence
positively the decision of having children, while it does not affect the decision relative to the
number of  children. This  could reflect an income  effect on  decision of having children.
Finally, the expected  survival rates and its variance are significant with a negative sign also
in the first stage. An increase in the variance of children survival, therefore, appears to reduce
not only the expected number, but also the probability of having children at all 9.
6. Conclusions
The estimates for India  show that the theoretical model proposed  appears to  find
support from the data. If we go back to Table I and compare the comparative static effect with
the empirical results,  we see that  the  sign we obtain for the relevant variables seems to
confirm the validity of the model for the case in which the degree of risk aversion is not
"very" high. Our findings have also implication for the debate about the relationship between
fertility and  mortality.  It  is  often  argued,  starting  from  the  observation  of  a  positive
relationship between fertility and mortality, that an improvement in, for example, general
sanitary conditions  leads to  a  reduction  of  the  fertility  rate.  This  conclusion does  not
necessarily hold when we introduce into the analysis the role of uncertainty about the survival
of children, or its empirical counterpart the variance of the survival rate.
problems  because  of the possible  endogeneity  of this variable.  However,  the exclusion  of  the actual  mortality
does  not  significantly  change  the estimates  of the other  parameters.
16One should evaluate the impact of a policy not only looking at its effects on the survival
rate, but  also on its variance. If an increase in the expected probability of survival is also
associated with a reduction of its variance, we have two contrasting effects. On the one hand,
the reduction of mortality will lead to a reduction of fertility. On the other hand, the reduction
in the risk associated with each child will generate incentives to higher fertility.
Finally, the use of the Hurdle model in the estimates has allowed us to identify a set of
variables  that  affects differently the  decision whether to  have children  and  the  decision
regarding the number of children. This finding highlights the importance of the use of this
model in studying processes linked to fertility.
9  - We  have  also estimated  a ZIP  model  in order  to verify  the robustness  of our  results.  The second  stage
estimates  do not show  any relevant  difference  with  those obtained  with  the Hurdle  model..
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19Table 2 - Summary statistics
Variables  Mean  Variance  Min  Max
Dependent  vanable
Number  of births  2.912  4.219  0.000  14.000
Age of husband  and  woman
Age of wife  30.321  69.061  13.000  49.000
Age of husband  35.309  88.633  14.000  70.000
Age of wife squared  1 10000  0.099  0.003  0.017  0.240
Age of husband  squared  / 10000  0.134  0.005  0.020  0.723
Mamage  duration
Marriage  duration  13.492  77.939  0.000  33.000
Mortality  and  survival  vanables
Number  of children  dead under 5  0.360  0.634  0.000  10.000
Variance  of survival  at village  level  0.177  0.004  0.002  0.330
Variance  of survival  at district level  0.181  0.002  0.028  0.289
Child  survival rate under 5 year at village level  0.901  0.003  0.621  0.995
Child survival rate under 5 year at district level  0.909  0.002  0.757  0.997
Religion  and  education  variables
Religion  1 - Hindu - Reference  group
Religion  2 - Muslim  0.096  0.087  0.000  1.000
Religion  3 - Christian  0.023  0.022  0.000  1.000
Religion  4 - Other  religions  0.038  0.036  0.000  1.000
Education  of husband 1 - Up  to primary  - Ref.  group
Education  of husband  2 - Up to middle  secondary  0.303  0.211  0.000  1.000
Education  of husband  3 - Up to higher  secondary  0.161  0.135  0.000  1.000
Education  of husband  4 - Graduation  and above  0.046  0.044  0.000  1.000
Education  of wife 1 - Up to primary  - Reference  group
Education  of wife 2 - Up  to middle  secondary  0.184  0.150  0.000  1.000
Education  of wife 3 - Up to higher  secondary  0.062  0.058  0.000  1.000
Education  of wife 4 - Graduation  and above  0.008  0.008  0.000  1.000
Income  variables
Income  group  1.889  1.304  1.000  5.000
Poverty  index  2.676  0.945  1.000  4.000
Household  income level  / 1000000  0.309  0.121  0.005  3.998
Landsize  3.047  3.436  1.000  6.000
Number of observations after eliminating missing values:  31559
20Tab. 3 - Estimates  of the number  of child  births
POISSON  MODELS
Specification  1  Specification  2
Variables  Param.  t-stat  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  t-stat
(MLE)  (PMLE)  _  (MLE)  (PMLE)
Constant  -2.596  -22.040  -24.470  -2.633  -22.270  -24.770
Age  wife  0.215  37.460  39.600  0.215  37.470  39.630
Age husband  0.020  4.329  4.985  0.020  4.377  5.046
Age  wife squared  -0.003  -37.440  -41.120  -0.003  -37.460  -41.170
Age  husband  squared  0.000  -4.811  -5.762  0.000  -4.850  -5.815
Religion  2  0.155  14.690  19.420  0.153  14.480  19.150
Religion  3  -0.052  -1.795  -2.026  -0.052  -1.805  -2.038
Religion  4  0.066  3.819  4.744  0.067  3.890  4.835
Education  husband  2  0.004  0.478  0.590  0.002  0.266  0.329
Education  husband  3  -0.012  -1.072  -1.263  -0.015  -1.279  -1.508
Education  husband  4  -0.001  -0.038  -0.043  -0.002  -0.100  -0.113
Education  wife 2  -0.052  -4.972  -5.721  -0.053  -5.030  -5.792
Education  wife  3  -0.155  -7.837  -8.042  -0.156  -7.870  -8.082
Education  wife  4  -0.311  -5.676  -5.248  -0.311  -5.667  -5.243
Household  income  level  0.006  0.568  0.678
Y1  0.313  3.490  4.345
Y2  0.149  3.409  4.204
Y3  0.095  3.094  3.764
Y4  0.051  1.905  2.267
Y5  0.021  1.761  2.118
Marriage  duration  0.029  24.870  30.810  0.029  24.830  30.760
Children  dead  under  5  0.190  61.180  104.000  0.191  61.190  104.000
Village  variance  survival  -0.907  -10.740  -13.140  -0.906  -10.730  -13.130
Village  Child  surv.  rate  under  5  -0.783  -8.080  -10.300  -0.787  -8.116  -10.350
District  variance  survival
District  Child  surv.  rate  under  5
Lee  (1986)  Test  1  -41.7  -41.7
Lee  (1986)  Test  2  -37.6  -39.7
Wooldridge  test  (t stat)  -.089  (-50.5)  -.089  (-50.7)
Pseudo  R2  0.199  0.200
Log-Likelihood  -53230.2  -53230.9
Degree  of  freedom  31540  31536
21Tab. 4 - Estimates of the number of child births
HURDLE  - POISSON  MODELS  (first  stage  Logit)
Specification  I  Specification  2
Variables  Param  t-stat  Param.  t-stat  Paramn.  t-stat  Param.  t-stat
I' stage  V stage  2-  stage  r  stage  1-  stage  -stage r stage r stage
Constant  -4.996  -17.850  -1.864  -13.790  -5.078  -18.030  -1.895  -13.970
Age wife  0.300  25.330  0.194  28.310  0.300  25.300  0.194  28.310
Age husband  0.053  5.547  0.012  2.222  0.053  5.546  0.012  2.280
Age wife squared  -0.004  -22.670  -0.003  -29.850  -0.004  -22.670  -0.003  -29.860
Age husband  squared  0000  -5.807  -0.000  -2.693  0.000  -5.804  -0.000  -2.743
Religion  2  0.083  2.786  0.165  14.760  0.081  2.706  0.163  14.560
Religion 3  0.165  2.340  -0.090  -2.710  0.167  2.359  -0.091  -2.730
Religion  4  0.125  2.680  0.067  3.525  0.127  2.731  0.068  3.573
Education  husband 2  0.023  1.090  0.001  0.075  0.026  1.225  -0.001  -0.163
Education  husband 3  -0.023  -0.848  -0.010  -0.782  -0.017  -0.623  -0.013  -1.066
Education  husband  4  0.052  1.096  -0.013  -0.560  0.062  1.302  -0.016  -0.683
Education  wife 2  0.013  0.518  -0.069  -5.901  0.014  0.566  -0.070  -5.970
Education  wife  3  -0.142  -3.565  -0.171  -7.274  -0.142  -3.558 -0.172  -7.313
Education  wife 4  -0.322  -3.343  -0.354  -5.066  -0.322  -3.340  -0.354  -5.065
Household income level  -0.024  -0.925  0.008  0.713
Y1  0.689  2.921  0.255  2.616
Y2  0.127  1.135  0.149  3.142
Y3  0.098  1.263  0.086  2.574
Y4  -0.025  -0.392  0.067  2.051
Y5  0.032  1.042  0.018  1.347
Marriage duration  0.014  6.751  0.037  26.080  0.015  6.892  0.037  26.000
Children dead under 5  0.177  -11.210  0.177  54.780
Village variance survival  -0.1721  -0.696  -1.047  -10.000  -0.157  -0.632  -1.052  -10.050
Village Child surv. rate under  5  -0.454  -2.152  -1.035  -11.210  -0.451  -2.135  -1.036  -11.210
Lee (1986)  Test 1  -39.1  -39.2
Lee (1986)  Test 2  -37.0  -37.1
Pseudo R2  0.247  0.247
Log-Likelihood  -53241.4  -53228.6
Degree  of  freedom  31522  31514
22Social Protection Discussion Paper Series
No.  Title
0002  Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems: Constraints and
Hypotheses, Preliminary Evidence and Future Research Agenda
9933  Coordinating Poverty Alleviation Programs with Regional and Local
Governments: The Experience of the Chilean Social Fund -FOSIS
9932  Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature
9931  Uncertainty About Children's Survival and Fertility: A Test Using Indian
Microdata
9930  Beneficiary Assessment of Social Funds
9929  Improving the Regulation and Supervision of Pension Funds: Are there
Lessons from the Banking Sector
9928  Notional Accounts as a Pension Reform Strategy: An Evaluation
9927  Parametric Reforms to Pay-As-You-Go Pension Systems
9926  An Asset-Based Approach to Social Risk Management: A Conceptual
Framework
9925  Migration from the Russian North During the Transition Period
9924  Pension Plans and Retirement Incentives
9923  Shaping Pension Reform in Poland: Security Through Diversity
9922  Latvian Pension Reform
9921  OECD Public Pension Programmes in Crisis: An Evaluation of the Reform
Options
9920  A Social Protection Strategy for Togo
9919  The Pension System in Singapore
9918  Labor Markets and Poverty in Bulgaria
9917  Taking Stock of Pension Reforms Around the World
9916  Child Labor and Schooling in Africa: A Comparative StudySocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9915  Evaluating the Impact of Active Labor Programs: Results of Cross Country
Studies in Europe and Central Asia
9914  Safety Nets in Transition Economies: Toward a Reform Strategy
9913  Public Service Employment: A Review of Programs in Selected OECD
Countries and Transition Economies
9912  The Role of NPOs in Policies to Combat Social Exclusion
9911  Unemployment and Unemployment Protection in Three Groups of Countries
9910  The Tax Treatment of Funded Pensions
9909  Russia's Social Protection Malaise: Key Reformn  Priorities as a Response to
the Present Crisis
9908  Causalities Between Social Capital and Social Funds
9907  Collecting and Transferring Pension Contributions
9906  Optimal Unemployment  Insurance: A Guide to the Literature
9905  The Effects of Legislative Change on Female Labour Supply: Marriage and
Divorce, Child and Spousal Support, Property Division and Pension Splitting
9904  Social Protection as Social Risk Management: Conceptual Underpinnings for
the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper
9903  A Bundle of Joy or an Expensive Luxury: A Comparative  Analysis of the
Economic Environment  for Family Formation in Western Europe
9902  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1998
9901  Active Labor Market Programs: A Review of the Evidence from Evaluations
9818  Child Labor and School Enrollment in Thailand in the 1990s
9817  Supervising Mandatory  Funded Pension Systems: Issues and Challenges
9816  Getting an Earful: A Review of Beneficiary Assessments of Social Funds
°81 5  This paper has been revised, see Discussion Paper Series No. 9923Social Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9814  Family Allowances
9813  Unemployment Benefits
9812  The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded Pension System
9811  An Alternative Technical Education System: A Case Study of Mexico
9810  Pension Reform in Britain
9809  Financing the Transition to Multipillar
9808  Women and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy: Growth Helps,
Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters
9807  The World Bank Approach to Pension Reform
9806  Government Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns
9805  The Hungarian Pension System in Transition
9804  Risks in Pensions and Annuities: Efficient Designs
9803  Building an Environment for Pension Reform in Developing Countries
9802  Export Processing Zones: A Review in Need of Update
9801  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1996Summary  Findings
In  this  paper  we  present  a non  altruistic  model  of  demand  for children
in  the  presence  of  uncertainty  about  children's  survival.  Children  are
seen  as  assets,  as  they  provide  help  during  old  age.  If certain  conditions
are  met,  both  the  financial  market  and  the  family  network  are  used  to
transfer  resources  to  old  age.  Theoretical  predictions  relative  to  the  change
in  the  mean  and  variance  of  the  survival  rate  are  derived.  The  empirical
analysis  is  based  on  data  from  the  Human  Development  of India  (HDI)
survey.  Different  models  for  count  data  variables,  such  as  Poisson,  Hurdle
and  Zl  models  have  been  employed  in  the  empirical  analysis.  The  results
highlight  the  importance  of  the  uncertainty  about  children's  survival  in
determining  parental  choices,  thus  showing  that  realized  or expected
children's  death  is not  the  only  dimension  that  links  fertility  decision  to
children's  mortality.  The  policy  implications  of  such  findings  are  briefly
discussed.
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